Part 3
Escalation and intensification of the Korean nuclear issue from 2009 to the present
As of March 2017, North Korea had conductedfive nuclear tests. The first occurred following the suspension of Six-Party Talks in 2006 due to the BDA issue and U.S. sanctions. The other fourtests all occurred after 2009, during which time the Six-Party Talks were completely stalled and a vicious cycle of escalation and intensificationtook over.
On January 20, 2009, newly-elected U.S. President Barack Obama assumed office. The year before, Lee Myung-bak replaced Roh Moo-hyun as South Korean president and instituted a tougher policy toward North Korea. As in the past, leadership changes brought new uncertainties to the Peninsula.
The new U.S. administration strongly believed that during the later years of the Bush presidency,North Korea had not been honoring its commitments in the various agreements and had been allowed to go too far in cheating and blackmailing the United States. Opposing any U.S.-DPRK deals became the “politically correct” stance in Washington, especially in military circles and on Capitol Hill. President Obama, who held a liberal worldview, repeatedly emphasized the importance of improving the country’s international image during his campaign, and advocated for a“nuclear-free world.” After taking office, he prioritized the promotion of international nuclear disarmament and global nuclear security cooperation.This put his administration in an awkward position, as it could neither continue on the path of compromise adopted by the Bush administrationin its later years, nor go straight toward a“muscle-flexing” policy path.
In his first inaugural address, President Obama declared to the “enemies of the U.S.” that “we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” That was an impressive statement. Ata Senate hearing before taking up the position of secretary of state, Hillary Clinton also indicated that the Obama administration would be more flexible and open in handling the U.S.-DPRK relationship compared to the Bush administration.
However, North Korea did not respond positively to this new gesture and tensions started to escalate following some incidents. In March, North Korea detained two female U.S. journalists who entered DPRK territory without permits while visiting the China-DPRK border area, but later released them into the care of former President Bill Clinton. On April 5, North Korea announced the launching of the experimental communication satellite Kwangmy?ngs?ng-2 and declared its exit from the Six-Party Talks on April 23. On April 25, the DPRK Foreign Ministry announced that it had begun to reprocess spent fuel rods taken from experimental nuclear reactors. On May 25, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. Apparently Pyongyang analyzed the situationand decided to take a tougher stance and became more inclined to acquire nuclear capabilities. It ishard to guess what prompted North Korea’s shift of stance, whether it was the political changes in South Korea or if it had simply lost confidence in the talks.
On June 12, 2009, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1874, which “condemned in the strongest terms” the nuclear test conducted by North Korea and demanded that it immediately and fully comply with its obligations under Resolution 1718. It also contained clear provisions banning the import and export of North Korean arms, as well as authorizing the inspectionof vessels related to North Korea and/or travelingto or from the country, which was intended to prevent the inflow of foreign funds into North Korea to develop missiles and nuclear weapons.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyangon October 4-6, 2009, as part of regular bilateral exchanges. He met Kim Jong-il and discussed the issue with him. Subsequently, tensions started to ease in January 2010 when North Korea expresseda willingness to sign a peace agreement with the U.S. within the six-party framework, on the condition that sanctions be removed prior to the talks. But the U.S. wanted the Six-Party Talks to be resumed first and a peace agreement to be discussed during the talks.
On March 26, 2010, the South Korean warship Cheonan, carrying 104 officers and crew onboard, sank in the waters between Baengnyeong Islandand Daecheong Island in the Yellow Sea, when an unidentified explosion hit the rear of the ship, causing 46 deaths. The U.S. and South Korea immediately accused North Korea of attacking thewarship with a submarine torpedo. Russia participatedin the international investigation that followed, while China did not. Although North Korea never acknowledged responsibility, South Korea announced the suspension of trade and exchanges. This undoubtedly increased tension and deepened distrust and antagonism between South Korea and North Korea and between the U.S. and North Korea.
On May 12, North Korea’s official newspaper, RodongSinmun, reported the country’s development of nuclear fusion technology. Soon after,following joint talks between the foreign and defenseministers of both South Korea and the U.S.,new sanctions were imposed by the U.S. on fiveentities and three individuals from North Koreaon the grounds that they supported the DPRK’s attainment of weapons of mass destruction.
China continued to mediate toward resuming the Six-Party Talks and, on March 15, 2011, the DPRK Foreign Ministry agreed to unconditionally rejoin the talks and to include in the discussions the issueof uranium enrichment. In October, North Korea held separate meetings with South Korea, the U.S., and Russia and also expressed willingness to unconditionally return to the Six-Party Talks.
Then on December 17, Kim Jong-il suddenly passed away.
Another important international event occurredin 2011 that is worth mentioning. In February, the Arab Spring spread to Libya, with people taking to the streets against Moammar Gadhafi. The demonstrations soon evolved into civil strife. On March 17, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized the creation of ano-fly zone over Libya. On March 19, France, Britain, the U.S., and other countries started to conduct air strikes in Libya, which had already given up weapons of mass destruction in 2003. On October 20, Gadhafi fell into the hands of the oppositionin Sirte and died in a tragic manner. When speaking to the public for the last time, Gadhafi mentioned that Kim Jong-il must have been lookingat him and laughing. Indeed, the DPRK kepta close eye on the situation in Libya. An article published in Rodong Sinmun on April 18 said, “Inrecent years, the tragedies of some countries which renounced the nuclear program half wayunder the U.S. pressure have clearly confirmed the sensible and correct choice North Korea hasmade. … Only by doing so can the national andethnic autonomy be safeguarded.”
Although concerned and wary following the events and aftermath of the Libyan uprising andthe Arab Spring, which might have had an impacton its considerations about pursuing the nuclearpath, North Korea did not totally give up dialogue.Kim Jong-il remained committed to the “unconditional resumption of the Six-Party Talks” until hisdeath on December 17, 2011. He was succeeded by his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, who initially continuedthe policy adopted by his father.
North Korea and the U.S. held a third round of high-level talks in Beijing on February 23-24, 2012,as the Six-Party Talks were yet to be restarted.The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling the September 19 Joint Statement, statingthat the Korean Armistice Agreement was the cornerstone of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula prior to the signing of a peace accord.They also agreed to simultaneously take confidence-building measures to improve DPRK-U.S.relations.
Subsequently, they separately released the February29 Agreement (or “Leap Day Agreement”). Although the documents were not identical, there were elements reflecting a basic consensus. Among the key points were: the DPRK should suspend nuclear tests and long-range missiletests as well as uranium enrichment activities, and allow the IAEA to verify and supervise its activities; and the U.S. should not be hostile to the DPRK and should be willing to improve relations and expand exchanges. The U.S. also promised to provide North Korea with 240,000 tons of nutritious food.
Over the coming weeks and months, the two sides made many claims and counterclaims. The essential dispute was whether the agreement includedthe launching of satellites. North Korea argued that the moratorium on long-range missiletests did not include the launching of satellites. But the U.S. insisted that launching satellites was included. Unfortunately, what exactly was agreed to on this matter remains unclear.
On the morning of April 13, 2012, North Korea launched its first application satellite, Kwangmy?ngs?ng-3, and the U.S. government decided to not deliver food aid as previously agreed. OnMay 2, the U.N. Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee updated the sanctions list, adding three North Korean entities. On May 13,the fifth session of the 12th Supreme People’sMeeting of the DPRK amended the country’s constitution,declaring in its preface, “Comrade Kim Jong-il has established our motherland as an invincible political and ideological power, a nuclearnation and an unrivaled military power.”
On June 18, President Obama accused NorthKorea of being a continuous threat to the U.S.and declared an extension of sanctions against Pyongyang for another year. On December 12,North Korea announced the successful launchof a second Kwangmy?ngs?ng-3 satellite, which was widely believed to be a Taepodong-2 missile. On February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test. On March 7, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094, condemning North Korea’s third nuclear testand issuing a new round of sanctions. On April2, the spokesperson for North Korea’s Atomic Energy Agency said that the Yongbyon 5-megawattgraphite-moderated reactor, which had been closed and sealed in 2007, would be restarted.
In 2014, after the U.S. and South Korea started the “Key Resolve” joint military exercises on February24, North Korea repeatedly launched varioustypes of missiles.
On May 20, 2015, North Korea issued a statement, claiming that it has achieved a miniaturized anddiversified “nuclear strike capability.”
The situation further escalated in 2016. North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6. On January 13, South Korean President Park Geun-hye announced at a press conference that the South Korean government would consider the introduction of the missile defense system knownas Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
On February 7, North Korea announced the launching of a satellite with a long-range rocket. On March 2, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2270, which in turn initiateda series of new sanctions.
From March to April 2016, the U.S. and South Korea conducted large-scale “Key Resolve” and“Foal Eagle” joint military exercises, involving more than 300,000 South Korean and 17,000 American soldiers with carrier battle groups, strategic bombers, and other strategic weaponry. The scale of these military exercises was larger than ever before in terms of the degree of weapons and the number of participants, and “decapitationstrikes” were also included. Almost every year since the 1970s, the U.S. and South Korea have conducted joint military exercises, including“Key Resolve,” “Ulchi Freedom Guardian,” and “Team Spirit.” In recent years, such military exercises have become increasingly large-scale andtargeted. North Korea, in response and in preparation,would mobilize its people into a war footing, redeploy military forces, and sometimes even recruit reserves to strengthen the standing army. Understandably, such a practice not only creates tension but also forces North Korea to expend a lot of manpower, materials, and financial resources,which has been a stress on the national economy and people’s livelihoods.
North Korea conducted five more test launches ofits Musudan missiles. On June 1, the U.S. Treasury Department designated North Korea “a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern” and, on July 6, it placed the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on the sanctions list for the first time. North Korea followed this by firing missiles up to 500 kilometers (311 miles) into the sea throughout July and August.
On August 22, the U.S. and South Korea started their annual “Ulchi-Freedom Guardian” joint military exercises. To protest, North Korea fireda submarine-launched ballistic missile into theeastern waters of the Peninsula on August 24 and three ballistic missiles into the sea on September 5. On September 9, North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test.
Eighty-two days later, on November 30, the U.N.Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2321 in response to North Korea’s fifth nucleartest. Most noticeably, the resolution imposed aceiling on coal exports, which had been North Korea’s largest export material. China again called for the parties to resume dialogue as soon aspossible to deal with their differences in a peaceful, diplomatic, and political manner.
Looking back on the eight years of the Obama administration, the U.S. linked the Korean nuclear issue with its disapproval of the North Korean regime. Indeed, the widely reported “brutality of theregime” has been a troubling concern within the international community. The U.S. adopted a policy of “strategic patience,” the essence of which was that no matter how North Korea conducted itself, the U.S. did not give any serious consideration to Pyongyang’s security concerns. If North Korea was willing to negotiate, the U.S. would talk but with no intention to make any progress. If North Korea chose confrontation, the U.S. would intensify sanctions. The ultimate purpose was to see the North Korean regime collapse under constant pressure. The U.S. maintained secret and semi-public bilateral contacts with North Korea in New York, Pyongyang, and Kuala Lumpur, but as long as North Korea refused to abandon its nuclear program, the role of such contacts was limited. So, the reality is that the Obama administration’s de facto tough policy concealed by the word “patience” bumped against North Korea’s strong will to possess nuclear power. The two countries reinforced each other in a negative direction, allowing the tense situation to slip into a downward spiral.
As the North Korean nuclear and missile programs continue to make progress, Washington’s“patience” is rapidly running out. Washington issaid to be reassessing North Korea’s potential to acquire deterrence against the U.S., and the timeline is believed to be not very long. Moreover, anti-North Korean sentiment is growing in the United States, and all kinds of stories about North Korea, though unverifiable, are spread widely. Capitol Hill had increasingly accused the Obama administration of being weak and incompetent in dealing with Pyongyang. The Trump administration, after taking office, has treated the Korean nuclear issue as a primary security challenge inAsia. There has also been some news coming out of military and strategic circles about the U.S.working with its allies to fine-tune a targeted strike plan against North Korea. This adds uncertainty, clouding the future of the Peninsula.
One newly added grave concern for China is thaton July 8, 2016, the U.S. and South Korea announced the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea. The AN/TPY-2 X-bandradar used in the THAAD system is reportedly the largest and most advanced land-based transportable radar, with a range of about 1,200-2,000 kilometers (746-1,243 miles). Its detection distancefor medium- and long-range missiles on the ascent stage is over 2,000 kilometers (1,243miles), and it can precisely calculate the expected impact points of warheads or false warheads froma distance of about 580 kilometers (361 miles).
If deployed in South Korea, even by the most conservative estimates, this radar would radiate through parts of northeastern and northern China as well as the Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea areas,thereby weakening China’s strategic deterrentand in turn exacerbating the already asymmetric strategic balance in the region. The U.S. already has strong missile defense systems in the western Pacific. Once the THAAD system is deployed in South Korea and is connected to and shares information with the two X-band radars in Japanand the THAAD system in Guam, it will be perceived as posing an increased threat to China’s strategic security.
China is also concerned that the deployment of THAAD in South Korea is only a new start to the U.S. pursuit of zero-sum security in the Asia Pacific. It has been reported that the U.S. is considering deploying THAAD in Japan and other parts of East Asia. If this becomes reality, China and the U.S. may have to confront more serious challenges regarding the question of strategic balance, which may push the Asia Pacific region into a strategicarms race.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen where the Korean nuclear issue is heading. There are three possibilities:
First possibility: The vicious cycle of U.S. and U.N. sanctions followed by North Korean nuclear and missile tests goes on until reaching a tippingpoint. For an isolated and relatively independent country such as North Korea, sanctions may exerthuge pressure, but the country can hold upand will not give up nuclear development just because of them. As a matter of fact, North Korea started nuclear testing after sanctions started, and it has conducted five tests against the background of intensified sanctions. So it is not hard to see that this situation could make the issue drag on into a spiral of intensified sanctions and continued nuclear testing until Korean nuclear and missile technologies reach a tipping point. Atthat point, those who oppose North Korea possessing nuclear weapons would be faced with the hard choice of taking extreme action with unknown consequences, or to lerating it.
This pattern is difficult to change because oftwo factors: First, North Korea is determined to possess nuclear capabilities in order to ensureits own security. This has been its policy choice,and has been increasingly reinforced over recent years. North Korea has perceived external security pressure and has not been successful at acquiring a security guarantee, despite having attended different forms of peace talks. The events in other countries like Libya have also affected Pyongyang’s thinking. Secondly, the United States is unwilling to make any compromise and refuses to make a deal with North Korea, and this has become a politically correct view, especially in the military and strategic circles. In the meantime,the U.S. is also making use of the tension to invest heavily in strategic deployment and military activities in Northeast Asia and, therefore,cannot focus itself on resolving the nuclear issue. Given its political habits, any adjustment in policy toward North Korea would meet strong resistance. Whether President Donald Trump can free himself from the old inertia and find a way out remains to be seen.
In the U.S., there is often talk about the military option. Every time this is seriously considered, the analysis invariably shows that, given the heavily deployed conventional and strategic weaponry across the Peninsula, military action, big or small,would cause huge civilian casualties and results that are hard to control. Keeping the military optionon the table also threatens stability and is a source of mistrust among the countries involved. As the situation gets closer to a tipping point, itis all the more important for the U.S. to carefully calculate its moves and for China and the U.S.,as well as other countries concerned, to better coordinate on future steps.
Second possibility: The North Korean regime collapses—which is what the U.S. and the South Korea want the most. The U.S. has long taken astance of non-recognition and hostility toward North Korea, with regime change as its main goal.This was also one of the fundamental principles of President Obama’s policy of strategic patience.To a large extent, the persistence of the U.S. in intensifying sanctions while giving no chance fortalks had the intention of pushing North Korea to undergo internal changes. In the U.S., contact and dialogue with North Korea are often regarded as helping the regime and hindering changes. That is why North Korea firmly believes that the U.S.will not change its hostile policy and, therefore,that it should take a strong position to resist. Thereality is that the Korean economy has already passed through its most difficult time. Kim Jongun,after taking up the mantle as North Korea’s top leader, has stabilized the domestic situation.Though North Korea’s domestic policy and behavior have caused wide resentment, the expectation of regime collapse as a solution to the Korean nuclear issue may not be realistic in the short term.
Third possibility: Talks and serious negotiations restart, which may ease or even resolve the nuclear issue. Admittedly, this is harder now as mistrust between the U.S. and North Korea has growndeeper over the years, and the ups, downs, and many setbacks throughout multilateral negotiations have undermined the parties’ confidence in dialogue. But past experience shows the obvious benefits of talking: First, talks helped stabilize the situation and created conditions for addressing mutual concerns. Second, talking opened the way to reaching various agreements. The September19 Joint Statement, February 13 Joint Document,and October 3 Joint Document, which were achieved through the Six-Party Talks, represent the maximum consensus among all parties and together provide a roadmap for a political solution to the Korean nuclear issue. The disruption of the talks was due to a failure to implement the agreements, and the nuclear issue has escalated in the absence of talks. It should be noted that,after years of escalation, the ground has shifted and the basis for negotiation has changed significantly since 2003. If talks are resumed, whetherall parties can accept such a reality and whether they can restart negotiations without preconditions remains an open question. In other words, if some parties assume nothing has happened or try to return to the past without considering changes, it will be hard for the new talks to succeed. Currently, one realistic starting point maybe a “double suspension.”
As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained ata press conference on March 8, 2017:
To defuse the looming crisis on the Peninsula,China proposes that, as a first step,the DPRK suspend its missile and nuclearactivities in exchange for a halting of largescaleU.S.-ROK exercises. This “double suspension”approach can help us break outof the security dilemma and bring the partiesback to the table. Then we can follow the dual-track approach of denuclearizing the Peninsula on the one hand and establishinga peace mechanism on the other. Only by addressing the parties’ concerns in a synchronized and reciprocal manner can we find a fundamental solution to lastingpeace and stability on the Peninsula.
In other words, China calls for parallel steps to address nuclear and security concerns.
At the most recent China-U.S. summit in Florida and the first round of the China-U.S. Diplomatic and Security Dialogue that was held on the sidelines in April 2017, the two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on the Korean nuclear issue. China reiterated that it is committed to denuclearization, peace, and stability on the Korean Peninsula,as well as a settlement through dialogue and consultation. China also said that it would continue to fully implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea. China further explained to the U.S. side its proposals of “double suspension” and a “dual-track approach of denuclearizing the Peninsula,” stressing its hope to achieve a breakthrough for resuming talks. China also reiterated its opposition to the deployment ofthe THAAD anti-missile system. During the summit, the two sides confirmed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a common goal, and agreed to keep close communication and coordination on the issue. This gives hope for a better understanding between China, the U.S., and the other parties concerned, and a better future forinclusive security in the Northeast Asia region.
To conclude, China’s interest lies in ensuring a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and preventing the disruption of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the whole of the Asia Pacific. China’s responsibility is to play a proactive role in achieving the above objectives through peaceful means, and to help bring about a peace accord, thus creating lasting peace and enabling greater cooperation in the region. China should also befirm in preventing any major turbulence or even conflict on the Peninsula. Only through dialogue can mutual security be achieved. In this way, we may help wrestle the Korean Peninsula out of itscurrent vicious cycle and prevent Northeast Asia from turning into a “Dark Forest.”
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